Yale University

EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale
Discussion Papers

Economic Growth Center

10-29-1970

On the Usefulness of a Presumptive Tax on Agricultural Land in
Colombia
R. Albert Berry

Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series

Recommended Citation
Berry, R. Albert, "On the Usefulness of a Presumptive Tax on Agricultural Land in Colombia" (1970).
Discussion Papers. 109.
https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/egcenter-discussion-paper-series/109

This Discussion Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Growth Center at EliScholar – A
Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Discussion Papers by an
authorized administrator of EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information,
please contact elischolar@yale.edu.

ECONOMIC GROWTH CENTER
YALE UNIVERSITY
Box 1987, Yale Station
New Haven, Connecticut

CENTER DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 101

ON THE USEFULNESS OF A PRESUMPTIVE TAX ON
AGRICULTURAL LAND IN COLOMBIA

R. Albert Berry

October 29, 1970

Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated
to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in
publication s to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the
author to protect the tentative character of these papers.

On the Usefulness of a Presumptive Tax on
Agricultural Land in Colombia
R. Albert Berry

For at least twenty years now the idea of a presumptive income tax on
agricultural land1 has formed part of the intellectual baggage brought to bear
in discussions of the problems of Colombia's agricultural sector.

Its most

recent appearance has been in connection with the Musgrave tax reform proposals
of 1969,(lnforme Musgrave, Bases Para Una Reforma Tributaria en Colombia,
(Bogota, Banco Popular, 1969), and although the tax could hardly be expected
to weather the political storms it would churn up in Colombia's conservative
congress, the chance that it will have some form of application in the future
seems not so small as to make its discussion irrelevant.

The idea dates back

2
to the 1949 World Bank Mission headed by Lauchlin Currie and Currie's obser
vation that the fertile valley flatlands (e.g., in the Cauca Valley) were
primarily used by their large latafundista style owners for extensive cattle
raising while small mountainside minifundias were of necessity used for crop
production by their owners.

As well as giving evidence of the severe inequality

characterizing the agricultural sector, this represented a highly inefficient
and inverted form of resource utilization.
11.e., a tax which would be administered essentially by applying a stan
dard assumed rate of return to agricultural ~and and including this· !l-,pr.eawn,d"
income as part of the individual's taxable income.
2

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development," A Development
Program for Colombia, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1951.
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The presumptive income tax proposal follows naturally from several charac
teristics of Colombia's agricultural sector; one is the highly unequal distribu
tion of land and correspondingly unequal distribution of income generated in
.
1
the sector; a second is the low average productivity of land (some of it high
quality) used in extensive cattle grazing or for other relatively low value
products; finally there is the fact that the tax administration has never been
able to collect much from farmers, especially from cattle raisers and this
constltutes a horizontal inequity in the tax system in favor of these groups. 2
In the light of the great need of municipal and departmental governments for
revenues to support local services (especially education-- ·which is financed
in most countries by the land tax) the government income argument in favor of
such a tax is strong.
The arguments against its application are that by raising the costs of
agricultural enterprises it will curtail investment and modernization, dis
courage growth of output, and raise the prices of agricultural goods.

Since

food prices are frequently alleged to play an important role in the inflationary
mechanism this, presumnbly 5 should be avoided if possible.

Further,

the possible discouragement to agricultural exports could have severe reper
cussions.
The discussion below presents a theoretical framework which seems relevant

1
.
According to a study by this author with reference to 1960, the top
10 percent of incon~e earners is agriculture probably received somewhat over
SO percent of the total income. See Albert Berry, "The Distribution of
Agriculturally Based Income in Colombia: 1960/' miroeo, 1969.
2
certain loss write-off priveleges of agricultural activities have meant
that the tax inequities created were even greater than those which would re
sult from simple non-paynent in agriculture; this no doubt contributed to the
low levels of. productivity EIS well.
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for the discussion of this issue in the Colombian context, as well as some of
the relevant empirical information which would be necessary to predict the
effects of the tax.

We may assume that the successfulness of the tax would

be measured in terms of its effects on total agricultural output, on distribu
tion of income generated in agriculture, on agricultural exports, on total
government revenues, on the horizontal equity of the overall tax system, and
possibly (as discussed below) on the composition of agricultural output.

Since

there seems no reason to believe that total tax revenues would not be increased

by the tax, we need not discuss this goal further but simply record it as a
benefit to be counted along with other benefits and weighed against any nega
tive effects.
We first discuss briefly the effects to be anticipated from such a tax
in the context of some very simple models; these provide a point of departure
for the discussion of the more complex characteristics of Colombia's agricul
tural sector.

The Effect of a Tax on Land Only (Not on Improvements) Where All Farmers are
Profit Maximizers and Factor Markets are Perfect
In this neoclassical world, the same factor proportions will be used

on

land of comparable quality and location, regardless of the size of the farm or
the tenure arrangement; the price of a unit of land will also be dependent only
on its quality and location. What is the effect of including in the individual's
taxable income an "assumed" income equal to, say 10% of the value of the land?
Assume first that the total amount of land is absolutely fixed.

Theim

mediate effect of the tax is, of course, to decrease the net earning power
(marginal private productivity) of land and hence decrease its value as an
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income-generating resource to its owner.

Given the perfection of all factor

markets, the price of land must fall, possibly until its rate of return is once
again at its original level.

If the wealth in the form of agricultural land

relative to total real wealth in the economy is small enough, then this result
will come about. 1 Where land forms an important part of the total wealth of
the economy, both current income and wealth of the private sector have fa11en
significantly so the interest rate, savings and wealth must be treated as vari
ables; whether there will be an attempt to increase savings and build up wealth
again depends on the over time preference system, the savings pattern, and on
investment behavior.

If one assumes that the increase in government revenues

has no effect on the private sector 9 s savings and investment behavior, and if
the combined effect of the decrease in wealth and in current income has been to
decrease present and future income in the same proportions, then there is no
obvious reason to expect either an increase or a decrease in the interest rate
or the savings rate; the equilibrium wealth level will fall by the amount of
the decrease in private returns to land divided by the (unchanged) interest
rate.

2

If the use of the government revenues involves services which the in-

dividual counts in his wealth estimates, one could argue that even less has

1
This would not occur if land produced more non-monetary returns than other
assets; in that case the price fall would be less than proportional to the fall
in the private benefits stream.
2
If the price of the land falls proportionately to the private income from
its rental, then an individual with the same wealth elasticity of present and
future consumption would be in equilibrium, i.e., he would not try to increase
or decrease savings in order to redistribute his total consumption over time.
If land price did not fall this much, the rate of transformation between present
and future consumption would have been changed, and, given the above prefer
ence system, people would begin to consume more in the present.
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changed. 1

But for the case in point, where it is assumed that the government's

expenditure pattern will imply income redistribution, it may be supposed that the
part of the population with wealth will interpret the decrease in the value of
their land as implying a decrease in their total wealth.

In any such case, the

interest rate could either rise or fall depending on the over time preference
system, so wealth in land could fall either more or less than

the current

private revenue from it; in this case the value of all other forms of capital
would also change in the same way.

2

If the farmers are all identical in terms of total wealth, income, and pre
ferences, the effects of the tax need not lead to any sales of land.

If, how

ever, they have different total income levels, and, with a progressive income
tax, pay at different marginal rates, the negative impact of the tax on the
returns to land will be greatest for the individuals with the highest incomes, so some of them wHl presumably sell land to individuals with lower
incomes.

But this will not lead to changes in factor proportions used in agri

culture or in agricultural output unless the farmers differ in some other
respect, e.g., managerial ability.
1

one can hypothesize many variations on this situation. If, for example,
the expenditure of the government tax revenues has an effect comparable to
future private spendings, then the need to hold private wealth from which to
live in the future will be decreased by the same amount as private wealth is
and the interest rate will stay the same with the amount of private wealth
going down as in the example in the text.
2
If the tax led to a proportionate decrease in current income and in the dis
counted value of future income (assuming an an unchanged interest rate), but the
marginal utility of consumption decreased more rapidly in the present than in the
future, there would be a desire to increase the savings rate. This would push
the interest rate down until the combined effect of the resulting higher real
investment rate and an increased value of non-reproducible assets like land (as
a result of the decreased interest rate) has raised the wealth to present con
sumption ratio to that consistent with the preference system. It is even possi
ble that the interest rate will fall far enough so total wealth will rise above
its original level; it would not be possible, however, for wealth to rise to a
point where W.r (current revenue from wealth) would also rise. The overall
impact on current consumption would thus be negative.
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Imperfect Capital Market

If capital markets are not perfect then different assets can have different
rates of return for a given individual and, correspondingly , the average rate of
return on different assets can vary.

The typical investor will be less willing

to alter the composition of his stock of assets because, at a given point in
time, there will be costs to his doing so.

When the capitalists who invest in

land tend to prefer this asset over other ones (the opposite holding for other
1
investors), it becomes more likely that the price of land will decrease by
the full proportion of the decrease in private income generated by it even when
it constitutes only a small portion of the total wealth in the system; it will,
rather, fall by some smaller amount.

The case is similar to the one analyzed

above where land was an important component of total wealth; here it plays a
comparable role for the group of investors in question.

The equilibrium price

of land in such a situation depends on the over time preference functions of
the investors, the rate of return on their alternative investment opportunities,
and their total wealth and liquidity.

Assume for a moment the extreme situa

tion in which they have no alternative investment opportunities which pay off
at all and that the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption is the
same in both present and future; then the price of land will again fall pro
portionately to its private rental.

As in the previous case, the land price

will tend to fall less in cases where the elasticity of utility in terms of
1
This form of immobility may be due, for example, to the fact that inter
mediation costs make it less profitable for an individual to invest in enter
prises not managed by himself; if the marginal productivity of capital (the
internal rate of return) is equated in all branches of the economy, then the
rate of return to be earned by investing through an intermediation system is
less by the cost of that intermediation.
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future consumption is greater than for present consumption at levels below the
originally programmed ones; this leads to the sort of situation where the indi
vidual is willing to be quite flexible in terms of current consumption to be
sure of a good level of future consumption; with the opposite type of preference
pattern the land prices would fall by a greater percent than the private rental
price, i.e., the rate of return to land would increase.
In the no-tax situation, when the land market is perfect (in the sense that
everyone must pay the same price) and the same is true for labor and capital,
and there are no economies or diseconomies of scale, factor proportions and
social efficiency will be the same on all farms, unless differing entrepreneur
1
ial talents of different individuals lead to different factor proportions.
When the presumptive tax leads to a fall in land prices proportionate to
that in land rentals, is there any reason to expect any change in factor use in
agriculture ? As long as the factor markets are perfect, no factor costs change
so one would not expect any individual farmers to change their factor proportions.
The presumably progressive nature of the income tax system, however, will alter
the internal rate of return to land more for some farmers than others and may
thus lead to sales; this could lead to some changes in factor proportions--not
theoretically predictable in direction.
.,2
.,
We may then conclude in this case that the' expected' effect of the pre-

sumptive income tax on resource utilization will be nil.

It will neither in

crease nor decrease output in the more or less neutral case used as a bench
mark above,bttt.either effect is theoretically possible.
1

The expected effect

social efficiency (defined in any interesting sense) cannot vary across
farms in this case; the income of the farmer is simply a measure of his human
resources, and with all markets perfect his contribution to total income equals
his own private income.
2
In the statistical sense.
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on the wealth of the landed class is negative; again there would be exceptions,
though it would be irapossible for future consumption out of that wealth to rise.
Note that in cases where quantity of usable land is variable in supply
(e.g., if there is uncolonized land which could be opened up), with other con
ditions as above, the pres_umptive income tax will have no effects on rate of
incorporation, as long as assessments are correct measures of land productivity,
since the correctly assessed value of marginal land is zero.

The discussion of

the problem of taxing improvements is carried out in the next section.

Tax on the Value of Land and Improvements
The conclusion for the cases discussed so far that there is in general no
expectation that the land tax will alter factor use or output in any specific
direction was dependent on the fact that only the fixed supply factor was being
taxed.

In fact assessments are almost always carried out on the basis of the

productive value of a rural property which is a function not only of its ori
ginal productive potential but also of improvements carried out on it.

It

would be almost impossible to evaluate the value in use of the land itself,
since the factor is so heterogeneous, 1 except by measuring how much it produces;
this, however, is a result of the land itself and of the improvements. 2 An in
centive problem is created with respect to investment when the income generated
by the improvements will be taxed.

It decreases the rate of return to invest

ment for any given level of investment.

Hence when the capital market is

1

Especially when climate and location are also allowed for.
2
Note that the need to assess land in relation to its productivity creates
its own problems; first, it means that private profit maximization after tax
involves a lower value of the variable used to measure productive potential
than would otherwise have been optimal; secondly, :for practical reasons assess
ment may be a function of value of output• 1.-ather than either value added or
income imputable to the factor 11:md; this will create another set of distorted
incentives.

. I
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perfect (so that investors are indifferent as to what they invest in), the amount
of investment in agriculture will be decreased and become sub-optimal.

To the

extent, however, that this investment is either important in the total invest
ment flow, or investors are relatively immobile between different capital mar
kets, the directional effect of the tax becomes unpredicatable; with what we
have above called a neutral overtime preference pattern, it will be negative;
but under a somewhat stronger overtime preference assumption as that which led
in the previous cases to an increase in savings and investment, such an increase
would occur here. 1

To the extent that the rate of investment in agriculture is

cut, it may be assumed that total income generated in the sector is cut and
that the price of agricultural goods as a whole is raised.
It is true, of course, that some of the relevant "improvements" which
increase agricultural productivity are a result of public investment.

As long

as it is assumed that neither their positive impact on the pretax income,
of the individual farm (nor the extent to which they are undertaken) will be
1

When presumed income only from land is taxed, we saw that a neutral over
time preference system leads to a decrease in land price proportionate to the
decrease in land rents. Thus the marginal rate of substitution between fore
gone present consumption and increased future consumption is unchanged. When
the desire to avoid a decrease in future consumption is stronger than that to
avoid a present decrease, this relation does change, making future consumption
more expensive in terms of present consumption, via a smaller fall in land
prices (and thus a lower rate of return to wealth held in land); but the changed
trade-off depends on the non-neutral preference system.
In the present case, with a neutral preference system, the cost of buying
future consumption in terms of present will be increased; since this tradeoff via new investment must be the same for any asset, it will also change for
savings . invested in land, i.e., the price of land itself will not fall propor
tionately to its rental. For the rate of return to stay constant the marginal
utility of future consumption would have to decline more rapidly than that of
present consumption (leading to a lower savings rate). Savings and investment
would only increase with a substantially non-neutral (how non-neutral depends
on how high the land tax is) preference of the opposite type.
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affected by their being taxed, then there is no incentive problem; taxing these
improvements is essentially the same as taxing the land itself.

To the extent

that such improvements result from pressure from the private sector, which in
turn is a function of the contribution they will make to private incomes, that
pressure may be lower than optimal if in fact a tax will be put on the income
they generate.

1

Under the most likely behavioral characteristics of the farmers, the im
pact on private investment will be negative (for example in Colombia many
large scale farmers can invest either in this sector or in other ones) so it
becomes relevant to know the relative importance of the improvements which it
is difficult or impossible to handle separately from land, from the unimproved land
and the improvements coming from public investment.

Clearly some forms of

improvements could be excluded from the assessment procedure if this were
necessary.

The figures in Colombia do suggest that the major part of the as

sessed value, according to current assessment procedures, resides in the land
itself.

And part of the assessed value, corresponding to certain improvements

like buildings, is calculated separately so the tax base could exclude these
easily.

The share of land value which it would be difficult to distinguish

from the land itself (irrigation, improved quality through good handling,
etc.) is probably less than 10 or 15 percent of the total.
It is relevant, further, to introduce here a complication which will be
discussed in greater detail below, namely that it is not necessarily bad in
view of the goals of a rational agricultural policy in Colombia, to discourage
investment in at least some parts of the commercial agricultural sector, it is
1

Alternatively, of course, it may be closer to optimal than before.
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it is the commercial sector where investment would appear to be mobile between
agriculture and other sectors.

And the presumption that decreased investment

in a subsector of agriculture would lower total output requires for its strict
applicability the assumption of perfect factor markets made above; as we see
below this presumption will be reversed and several others will become at least
indeterminate, when this assumption is dropped.

Factor Productivity Higher and Labor-Intensity Greater on Smaller Farms
A prominent feature characteristic of Colombiavs agriculture (and that of
many, if not all, underdeveloped countries) is a higher value added per heetare, l and probably substantially higher value added per unit of capital (although figures are less complete on this)

on small farms than on large ones.

The explanation for the lower land and capital productivity on large farms will
not detain us here since it is not relevant to the subsequent analysis. 2

What

is relevant is the conclusion, which does not follow directly from the higher
land and capital productivity of the small farms, that their.total
factor productivity is higher when all factors are correctly valued at their
1

Also higher value added per unit of land measured by value.
2
The possible explanations of this phenomenon include the fact that the
private cost of labor is smaller on small farm.s so it pays to use more of it,
generating, other things being equal, a higher output per hectare; some large
farms clearly are not operated in a profit maximizing fashion in either or
both of two senses--in some cases, without essentially changing his own input
the fanner could increase his profitability-·-this is probably the less fre
quent case; the mo:re frequent one involves the f;:ict that the farmer who is
an absentee owner has other uses for his time and although if he spent more
time on the farm he would earn more from it? J:lis total earnings might fall,
or at least his real income would fall since he does not wish to live on the
farm. The prestige value of Lmd &nd the sometime profitability of land
speculation are frequently ment:i.oned causes of one or both types of non-profit
maximizing behavior.
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social opportunity cost.

The argument that they are more productive is presented

in a separate study; 1 the condition required to give this result (along with the
higher land and capital productivity on the small farms) is a sufficiently low
shadow price for labor; this condition appears to hold in Colombia.
Consider now
framework.

the impact of a presumptive income tax in this more realistic

Most of the small farmers, despite their high value added to hectare

and to capital ratios, have income levels sufficiently low as to be exempt from
income tax.

The individuals who would (legally) have to pay taxes are medium

and large scale farmers.
small farm sector.

Thus, the tax would have no direct effect on the

It would affect the large scale sector, along the lines of

the discussion of previous sections.
larger to smaller farmers.

And it might lead to land being sold from

If we hypothesize two separate land markets, one

for large (inefficient) farms, and one for the small (efficient) ones, then
there might be no output or efficiency implications in either group of farms;
alternatively some changes (either decreases or increases in output and in
vestment) might occur in the large scale sector.

For an individual already

maximizing profits, it is clear that nothing happens.

Where that is not the case,

it seems reasonable to conclude that most farmers would increase the intensity
of their operation; 2

an individual with a neutral over time preference system

would presumably do so.

If one dominant tendency on the large farms is to

increase output, this could increase or lower the income of the small farmers
depending on the product composition of the large farmers output.
1

Albert Berry, "Land Distribution, Income Distribution and the Productive
Efficinecy of Colombian Agrj_culture,;v mimeo, 1970.
2
one cannot completely disregard the possibility that the need to make more
money would, by forcing more care in the use of resources, le3d a few large
farmers to discard some non-profit-maximizing innovations they had previously
made; this might lead to either a decrease or increase in output, also in
labor used; everything appears to depend on the individual case too much for
generalization.
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An important question is whether a substantial amount of land would change
hands as a result of the price fall which would occur for large farms.

One

possibility is that as the land at its original price becomes too expensive for
those who held it, and its price falls, it will be purchased by smaller farmers
who were previously unable to buy either because of lack of personal liquidity,
the imperfectness of the capital market making it impossible for them to get credit(an
obvious reality of the situation in Colombia), or the desire of the large landowner not to break up his land into smaller plots, on the grounds that if he
later wished to sell the whole farm it would sell better as a unit. 1

The

implications of this type of land transfer would be positive in all respects.
Total factor productivity and total output would rise, and both income and
wealth distribution would be improved over time.

It is probable that the ex

landholder who would usually be involved in other sectors of the economy could
invest his funds better elsewhere both from a private and a social point of
view.

In this case the price of the land previously held in large farms would

not fall as far as under the conditions discussed in the earlier section; note
that in this case there is no uniform price of land but rather two separate
prices (for land of given quality, location, etc.).
A second possibility, having completely opposite implications, is that the
people with both the liquidity and the interest to buy up land as its price
falls are even wealthier individuals than those who sell in the original in
stance, ones who can better afford the luxury of holding land at a low rate
of return.

This eventuality would be the more likely the lower the presumptive

1
This last argument would decrease in validity as the feasibility of hold
ing land in large plots decreased and the market for them became thinner.
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land tax were fixed; if this tax were high enough (say 10 percent) it seems
rather unlikely that many people would be able to sustain it for many years. 1
A third possibility is that land will not be sold by the large land-holders
but will be rented out.

Since the incentive which leads to this is the need

for more income, it may be presmned that the land is now more intensively used
than before.

Such renting out can result from a land tax only when the owner

was not profit maximizing before, perhaps because he "preferred" the previous
use of the land (e.g., cattle raising) or simply because he was not very inter
ested in raising his income.

The implications of such a change in land use are

definitely positive in terms of the effect on output and probably so in terms
of labor utilized on the land in question; once again, however, there is the
possibility of negative effects on small farmers if the crops produced are
competitive with those of the small farmers.
It may be concluded from the above that one of the key questions in the
prediction of the ultimate effects of the tax is the nature of the land mar
ket, the extent to which the farms can be broken up into smaller units, and
how much smaller.

There seems little question that there would be cases of

breaking up of large farms into the smaller, medium sized units, typically
farmed by resident or close-to-the-farm owners.

It is rather unlikely, how

ever, that the breal. up of a 1,000 hectare farri., would be into farms of five
or ten hectares.

TM.s complicates

income distribution impact,
1

quite considerably prediction of the

If the 1.an<l transfers resulting from the tax

A third possibility, (or more accurately a certainty) is that the large
landholders will try through legal means to avoid the tax by dividing their
properties among different members of the family or using similar devices to
circumvent it. A good administrative system would not have much difficulty
keeping t~ack of a few hundred or so individuals who might be trying to do this,
but usually the laws leave many such loopholes, so that a good administration
may not be enough.
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were in fact from large to medium sized owners, then in order to know whether
landless farmers and small family farmers will benefit or not, it may be neces
sary to evaluate the relative competitiveness of medium size farms with the
small ones as opposed to large farms and the small ones; it would not be hard
to believe that the competition were more severe in the former case since the
really large farms operate primarily in cattle~ not important on the small ones.
On the other hand, it may be that the hired hand per hectare ratio is higher on
medium sized farms than on large ones so that landless farmers would be bene
fitted by a transfer to medium operators.

The figures available to us on

Colombia, dubious as they are, tend to indicate that both hired man days/
hectare and hired man days per effective hectare are higher on medium sized
farms than on large ones. 1

1Based on a rather low confidence
hired labor by farm size calculated in
~- cit., statistical appendix. Using
figures on hired labor per hectare and

level estimate of the distribution of
11
Albert Berry, "The Distribution •••.
11
this "best guess distribution, the
effective hectare are as follows:
Han Years/Effective Hectare

Farm Size

Man Years/Hectare

5-10

.090

.062

10-20

.060

.068

20-50

.035

.047

50-100

.020

.030

100-200

.013

.021

200-500

.009

.015

500-1,000

.006

.011

1,000

.002

.006

>

The methodology of the calculation of labor distribution suggests that the
degree of underestimation of the two ratios on large relative to medium farms
would not likely be greater than 50 percent; thus the result deduced here
would not likely be reversed. An"effective hectare" is defined arbitrarily as
land worth as much money as the typical hectare on farms in the size group
4-5 hectares.
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Summary:
A presumptive

income tax on land in Colombia is perhaps_one of the safer

policy measures possible in terms of the low probability of its having negative
results, if carefully applied (e.g., perhaps gradually rather than suddenly,
etc.).

Output of agricultural produce would increase and distribution of in

come would probably improve--certainly it would in some senses.
of the largest farmers would decrease.

The income

Income of both small scale farmers and

landless workers could increase, though empirical analyses would be required
to verify this.

Equity of the tax system would probably improve and tax reve

nues would increase.
The main directions of research which would be necessary to pin down the
effects of the tax would be on the nature of the land market, the factor pro
portions and crop compositions of the groups of farms affected (either by the
tax itself or because they buy or sell land as a result of it), and the pre
ference systems and mobility between sectors of the larger scale farmers.

